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Abstract 
Lano, K., The intuitionistic alternative set theory, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59 (1993) 
141-156. 
The Alternative Set Theory, as defined in Vopenka and Sochor, demonstrates how a set theory 
which avoids actually infinite sets can serve as a framework for much of classical mathematics. 
This paper defines a theory which can serve as an intuitionistic analogue of AST, and examines 
motivations for alternative formulations of classical AST from an intuitionistic and finitistic 
viewpoint. The intuitionistic AST uses appropriate modifications of the concepts of AST, with 
the notion of feasibility replacing Fniteness, and with new distinctions between alternative 
definitions of Countable Class and Revealment. Results of classical AST which are still valid in 
this new system are given, and an interpretation of the corresponding classical system in the 
intuitionistic system is defined. This shows that the adoption of an intuitionistic logic does not 
essentially deprive us of classical methods or results for AST. 
1. Introduction 
When the AST is examined from an intuitionistic viewpoint, several questions 
arise: 
(i) Can the existence of proper semisets with decidable membership relations 
be justified? 
(ii) Should induction or comprehension principles be adopted as basic? 
(iii) Why should all countable classes be isomorphic? 
(iv) Can we justify set and class comprehension principles using impredicative 
definitions? 
(v) Can we assert the explicit existence of nonfinite sets, that is, sets which 
cannot be ‘constructed’? 
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These issues are problematic for both classical and intuitionistic AST, as the 
motivation for classical AST is based on the concepts of construction or 
enumeration of sets: an infinite set (with a proper sub-semiset) is simply a set that 
cannot be enumerated. 
The key issue behind these questions is ‘what is the concept of set’. The answer 
given in classical AST, as in the NGB set theory, is 
set(X) = 3Y (X E Y). 
But as is argued in [6], this is inappropriate in that if we can assert the existence 
of an object X, what prevents us from forming {X}? We prefer a more specific 
characterisation of sets, that is, the original Zermelo concept of a set as being a 
‘finite plurality with a clear boundary’, formalised here as a set in the sense of 
AST which has a decidable membership relation. Therefore we shall use a 
two-sorted logic, with sorts of Classes, and of Sets, the latter being a subsort of 
the first, and with the stipulation that all sets have decidable membership. 
In the following we denote our modified (weakened) theory of classical AST by 
G, or A,,-AST, and the intuitionistic analogue by A,-IAST or G. 
(i) A class X is decidable if Vy (y E X v y 4 X); if such a class X is contained 
within a set x, then it is itself a set-it is finite since it is a subclass of a set, and it 
has a ‘clear boundary’ since it is decidable. Note that we might require more than 
decidability for a ‘clear boundary’ to exist; for instance that there is a 
A,-set-theoretic definition. The examples motivating the existence of proper 
semisets in [ll] and [9] deal with vague predicates (‘is an ape’, ‘is bald’), which 
for particular examples (e.g. homo erectus, a man partially bald), have no clear 
truth value. The problem is not in fact that the underlying (enclosing) sets cannot 
be enumerated or inspected, but that there is no clear line that can be drawn 
between the members of the required subclass and those outside it. 
Intuitionistic A,-AST addresses this problem by introducing a primitive concept 
of feasibility which corresponds to the idea of a (hereditarily) finite or enumerable 
set in AST. We require that any decidable subclass of a feasible set is a set. 
However there can be proper sub-semisets of any nonempty set; these arise from 
vague or undecidable predicates; for example 
{x E {O}: x = 0 A Fermat’s Last Theorem} 
which may be 0 or {O} and we have no way of determining which. Such 
sub-semisets X of feasible sets will in fact be such that llset(X) so that they 
cannot be proved either to be sets or to be nonsets. 
In this way we separate the concepts of finite and feasible; all sets are finite but 
a more relevant distinction can be made between those that can be feasibly 
‘constructed’ and those that cannot. The use of ‘finite’ for this concept of 
feasibility in AST introduces a confusion. 
(ii) In classical AST an induction principle (A-41 in [8]) is taken as a basic 
characterisation of the universe of sets. This is an indirect means of asserting that 
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all sets are formally finite (can be ‘reached’ by a possibly nonstandard finite 
number of set-successor operations from 0). In place of this we could assume 
comprehension 
3yvz(zEy = ZEXAc#(Z)) 
for the class of properties @ required in the schema of induction, together with 
Dedekind Finiteness of all sets: 
VzVycz(y-z*y=z) 
where z =y means that there exists a set isomorphism between z and y. This 
serves to isolate the finiteness assumption, and gives a uniform method of 
characterising sets and finite sets. In the classical systems the concept of feasibility 
can be defined either by using induction principles or by using comprehension 
principles; in the intuitionistic system we use an induction principle, and justify 
this by proof-theoretic arguments: if we have a systematic way of deriving the 
truth of a property 4 at a set x U {y} given its truth at feasible sets X, y, then we 
have a systematic way of establishing the truth of $ at any feasible set: these are 
the meanings of the intuitionistic quantifications in the axiom. 
This method must exist whatever predicate 8 is used, so there must be some 
intrinsic property of the feasible sets which guarantees this-that proof steps can 
always be concatenated validly along a sequence of their construction, because of 
the simplicity and algorithmic nature of this construction. 
The class of feasible sets is taken as the smallest definable class for which such a 
general algorithmic method of construction exists, and that contains 0 and is 
closed under set-successor. 
(iii) That all countable classes are isomorphic is a consequence of a very strong 
theorem [ll, p. 311 on well-orders, which does not seem intuitively reasonable. 
We may consider it more natural to allow the possibility of non-isomorphic 
candidates for natural number systems, Simply Infinite Systems in the terminology 
of [5], which provide different means of measurement. 
(iv) Set and class existence principles that allow impredicative definitions are 
not consistent with constructive motivations for a set theory. Such principles 
assume that the ‘totality’ of sets or classes can be examined, whilst these totalities 
themselves are vague in extent and not precisely determined. 
The problem derives from the interpretation of quantifiers classically, when the 
totality we are quantifying over is not finite. Classical logic is the logic of the finite 
(Brouwer’s Principle [2]), and is not appropriate for reasoning about uncompl- 
eted infinities. Thus we restrict class comprehension to predicates without class 
quantification, and comprehension for general sets to A0 predicates. 
(v) Explicitly asserting the existence of infeasible (or nonfinite) sets is 
intuitively unreasonable: in intuitionistic logic, the statement 3x P states that an 
actual example of an object satisfying P can be constructed; so that we would be 
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asserting a contradiction with 
3x (ifeasible(x 
Instead, in do-IAST we regard constructive existence as more general than 
feasible existence: 
3x (feasible(x) A P), 
and we assert that infeasible sets are always possible: 
1+x (ifeasible(x 
But not that we can necessarily isolate individual infeasible sets. 
2. Results 
The basic results contained in this paper are as follows: 
(i) A survey of theorems and concepts of classical AST which remain valid in 
do-AST and do-IAST. 
(ii) An interpretation of do-AST in classical AST. 
(iii) An interpretation of do-AST in A,,-IAST. 
(iv) An interpretation of classical AST in IAST. 
Our motivation is not to create an ‘alternative foundation’ for mathematics, but 
to create a framework in which concepts of feasibility and vagueness have a 
central place, and which therefore allow us to represent systems which classical 
mathematics cannot naturally approach. 
However, this theory does provide an alternative interpretation for the original 
motivation of AST, in such a way that the implicit issues of constructibility and 
infinite collections are addressed in a coherent framework using the insights of 
intuitionism to clarify the issues of what we really mean by finite, constructible, 
and set, and how these concepts interact. 
3. Axioms and basic concepts 
The system 4 of A,-AST generalises AST in allowing set-theoretically 
definable proper semisets but retains classical ogic for classes. q is the following 
theory in the 2-sorted first-order language L with binary predicates E, = of the 
sorts indicated below, and unary predicate feasible, of set sort. The usual 
operation symbols for sets are included: 
Zero: 0, 
Set-successor: U { } , 
Power set: P, 
Transitive closure : Tc. 
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Vuriubles for sets are (uJ~.~, and for classes (~)i~o, denoted by 
x, y, z, u, v, . . . and X, Y, Z, . . . respectively. 
Set terms are terms of L not involving class variables. 
Class terms are the class variables. 
Atomic formulae are n = 5, t E f, feasible(t), where r~, E are class or set terms 
and t is a set term. Other formulae are constructed from these using the usual 
connectives and quantifiers. 
A formula @ is a set formula if it contains no class terms and no occurrences of 
the predicate feasible. It is A0 if all quantifiers in it are of the form (Qx E t) where 
t is a set term not containing x. A formula is A,-set-theoretic (do-s-t) if both of 
these hold. A formula is normal (or predicative) if no quantifier on a class 
variable occurs in it. 
Class constants and complex terms are introduced by axiom A2 below. V is the 
class of all sets, and Feus denotes the class of feasible sets. A class X is 
set-theoretically-dejked (std) if there is some set-formula 47 such that 
vz (2 E x = cp(z)). 
This can be expressed as a formal property in the language, similarly for 
A,-set-theoretically-defined (A,-std). Our axioms can then be given as: 
Axioms 
AO. Classical Logic in this language. 
Al. (VX VY)(X = Y = Vz (z E X = z E Y)), 
a version of extensionality for each of the four equality predicates. 
A2. (3X Vz)(z E X = #(z)) 
where X is not free in 9, and 4 is normal. 
A3. Vx (x f 0+ (3y E x)(Vz E y)(z 4 x)). 
A4. Vx (x $0). 
A5. VxVyVt(texU{y} = t=yvtEx). 
A6 HO) A vx VY (44x) * G(Y) + 9(x u {Y I)) 3 vx 44x) 
for # A,-s-t. 
A7. VxVy(y~lP’x = VtEy(tEx)), 
y EX is used to denote Vt E y(t EX) as usual. 
A8. vx (Vz E zk(x))(z & R(x)) A (x G z-c(x)) 
A (Vs E P( Tc(x)))(x E s A (Vz E s)(z ES) *s = R(x)). 
A9. Vx 3X (X = x). 
These, with the exception of A2, constitute our basic system of A,-AST, 
denoted below by r We therefore have axioms Al, A3, A21 of [8], and A22 will 
also hold if we read finite as small. The axiom A41 is restricted to A0 formulae. 
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3.1. Axioms for feasibility 
In order to enable us to define a generalisation of AST in intuitionistic logic, 
we replace the defined notion of ‘hereditarily finite’ in AST by a primitive 
concept of feasibility. We require the following basic properties: 
Fl. feusible(0). 
F2. feasible(x) A feasible(y) + feusible(x u {y}). 
F3. 440) * (vxvy)(@(x) A G(Y) * 44x U (~1)) + (Vx)(feusible(x) 3 G(x)) 
for any formula $ of the language. 
F4. feasible(x) + (Vy EX) feasible(y). 
F5. 3x lfeusible(x). 
We denote the above system by r,. 
4. Intuitionistic A-AST 
The thoery rO of intuitionistic do-AST has axioms of intuitionistic predicate 
logic in the 2-sorted language of sets and classes, and axioms Al-A9 of r,, with 
axioms Fl-F4 of feasibility, with axiom F5 weakened to: 
F5’. 11(3x)(lfeasible(x)). 
We require that A,-set-formulae behave classically: 
Cl. vxvy(xEyvx$y). 
c2. VxVy(x=yvx+y). 
C3. (Vx E Y) $6) v l(VX E Y) $(x) 
for $ a A,,-set-theoretic formula. 
c4. (3x E y) #(x) = l(VX E y) l@(X) 
for $J a A,,-set-theoretic formula. 
(In fact C3 and C4 are derivable from Cl and C2 by induction on formula 
complexity and by set-successor induction on y.) 
We will postulate further extensions to this system below. In both theories the 
standard definitions of unordered and ordered pairs, functions, injections, range 
run and domain dom will be taken. We define 
Y - f 4 (3F)(F : v+ 5 an injective, onto function) 
for set or class terms v, 5;, and the set version: 
X2Y A (If)(f :x + y un injective, onto function). 
small(X) P (Zx)(feusible(x) A x -X). 
set(X) & (3x)(x =X). 
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In the following we will work in G unless noted; as 4 extends r, we therefore 
establish results for both theories. 
The axioms imply that the usual constructions of unions and iterated unions 
exist, and that abstraction terms {z E a: #J(Z)} exist for any A,-set-theoretic @ in 
the language. 
The following are basic technical results which correspond to the results of [ll] 
for classical AST. 
Lemma 1.1. In G: 
(i) 8 v (lf3) for any A,-set-formula 8. 
(ii) 4(O) A Vx Vy (feasibk(x) A feasible(y) A @(x) A 44~) + $(x U (~1)) + 
Vx(feusible (x) + 4 (x)) for all formulae #. 
(iii) feasible(x) 3 feusible(run x) A feusible(P(x)). 
(iv) Vx Vy (x < y v y <x) where x =S y denotes that there is a set embedding 
from x into y. 
(ii) is a direct consequence of F3. We can also prove that all sets are Dedekind 
finite and that A,-comprehension holds for all sets: 
Lemma 1.2. In &: 
(9 (VY E WX))(Y =x =2 y =x). 
(ii) (Vx)(ily)(Vz)(z ey = .z E x A q(z)) for Q, a do-set-theoretic formula. 
We also obtain a form of induction for small sets which is identical to that 
provable for finite sets in AST, and a form of e-induction for feasible set: 
Lemma 1.3. In G: 
6) #(0) A Vx VY (small(x) A #(x) 3 4(x U {Y >)) 
3 Vx (small(x) + @(x)), 
(ii) Vx (feasible(x) A (Vy E x) @(y) + #(x)) + Vx (feasible(x) + #(x)) 
where $ is any formula of the language. 
Both of these follow by applying feasible induction (Lemma l.l(ii)). 
Further, in r2 we can prove that all decidable subclasses of small sets are sets, 
and that all subclasses of small sets are ‘not not’ sets: 
Lemma 1.4. In G: 
(i) Collection : 
Vu (smWu) * [W E u) 3~ @(x, Y) * 3~ (Vx E UK+ E v) 9(x, y)]), 
(ii) Comprehension : 
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where $I b any formula of the language. We can also establish 
(iii) Vu (smalZ(u) 3 (Vu e u)(7l(#(v) v l+(v)))) 
for any formula I#, and 
(iv) Vu (small(u) 3 ~+lyvz(zEy=zEuA~(z))). 
These are established by induction for small sets (Lemma 1.3(i)). The main 
result we wish to prove is a theorem (Theorem 1.1 below) which is a powerful 
consequence of the Prolongation Axiom in Vopenka’s AST. The basic results 
which provide this are as follows: 
Lemma 1.5 
(i) tlx (3+? E F’(x”))(l linearly orders x). 
(ii) Vx (Ve E p’(x”))(Vz E EJ(x))(z # 0 A C linearly orders x 
+ (3, r E z)(l is e-first in z A r is cP-fast in z)). 
(iii) Vx (feasible(x) jVF (function(F) A dam(F) =x 
A (Vy E ran F)(feasibfe(y)) + feasible(F) A feasible(ran F))). 
These are established by feasible or A,-set-theoretic inductions. An interesting 
consequence of (i), and hence of A,-set-theoretic induction, is: 
Lemma 1.6. lsmall(x) + (3Y 5 x) iset( 
Proof. Y = {u E x: small((u],)} is the required class, where r E x 2 is a linear 
order of x, and (u], denotes {v EX: (v, u) E r}. 0 
We can obtain versions of theorems of AST for well-orderings if we take the 
following definition. 
Definition. If A and L are classes, then we say that L well-orders A, We(A, L), if 
L linearly orders A, and every inhabited decidable subclass of A has an L-least 
element, and full induction holds up A: 
(Vx E A)((~Y <LX) O(Y) 3 e(x)) 3 (Vx E A) e(x) 
for any formula 8. 
4.1. Countable classes 
Countable classes remain a very important concept in the intuitionistic theory 
of AST, and represent the failure of surveyability of sufficiently complex 
properties over ‘large’ sets; if (X, L) is a countable class then X cannot be a set, 
and induction over any set enclosing X on ‘z E X’ fails. 
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Definition (Ii). A pair (A, L) of classes is an ordering of fype w if: 
(i) L linearly orders A, 
(i) (Vx E A) small ((xl& 
(iii) ismall( 
In classical ogic this coincides with the (intuitionistically stronger) definition: 
Debit-ion (Q. (A, L) is an ordering of type o if: 
(i) L linearly orders A, 
(ii) 3y (Y EA), 
(iii) (Vx E A)(3y E A)(x cL y), 
(iv) (Vx E A) small((x],). 
Examples can be given of pairs satisfying the r, definition but not the & 
definition in Kripke models of G. Intuitively such models allow partial member- 
ship of sets in classes: x E, X meaning that x is in X to degree p. If n > 0 is FN (as 
defined in the next section), and we define X to be a class that has: 
ic,X foricn (i.e.,iEX), 
iEpX for i>n 
where p E 9, 9 a Heyting algebra with 0 Cp < 1 in 9 and p* = 0, then t taking 
the natural linear order on X, we have that (X, L) is an ordering of type o under 
the first definition but not the second. 
Definition. We define X to be a countable class if there is a linear order L such 
that (X, L) is an ordering of type w. Then the basic results for countable classes 
of [ll] still hold, if we replace finite by small in their statements. Note that the 
nonset class constructed in the above example (Lemma 1.6) is actually countable, 
given the ordering r 1 Y. 
4.2. Natural numbers 
The definition of natural numbers N and finite natural numbers FN can be 
performed exactly as in [ll], and we get corresponding results: that A,-set- 
theoretic induction holds over N and full induction holds over FN. 
Definition (G) 
ordinal(x) 8 (Vy ~x)(y GX) A (Vy, z ex)(y E z v z EY v z = y), 
N = {x: ordinal(x)}, 
FN = {x : feasible(x) A x E N} = {x: small(x) A x E N}. 
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If we define: 
XkascaleforY P (VyeY)(3x~X)(x=y), 
then we can show that FN is a scale for Fess the class of feasible sets, and for Sm 
the class of small sets, however it cannot be proved that N is a scale for V in r,. 
We can however perform definition by recursion up the feasible natural numbers 
just as in standard AST. If we define addition and multiplication for ordinals as in 
[ll], we obtain: 
Lemma 1.7. (i) (FN, =z, -, +, 0, a) is a model of Peano Arithmetic in G, and 
(ii) (FN, C, 0, +, 0, a) is a model of Heyting Arithmetic in I& 
where (J is the usual successor operator. 
4.3. The axiom of prolongation 
In [ll] and the subsequent development of AST, the prolongation axiom is of 
critical importance; it implies that there are proper semisets, and allows many 
distinctive results to be obtained. It is also the key to the development of 
conventional mathematical areas such as topology within the theory. Although we 
will not accept the full version of the axiom in the intuitionistic theory, we will 
show that many of the significant consequences of the axiom can still be proved in 
the theory r,, and hence, via the interpretation of the classical in the intuitionistic 
theory, in r,. 
Definition (4) 
AlO. Prolongation : 
VXVY ((X, Y) of type 0 h function (X) 
j 3f 3 C (function(f) A 8 li Y A t? linearly orders f A f =, X)) 
where CZQ Y denotes that Y is an initial segment of L 
The corresponding axiom in r, is the same except that the succedent of the 
matrix of the formula is double negated: 
VXVY ((X, Y) of type 0 h function(X) 
$113f38(function(f) A k’liY A elinearlyordersf Af 2X)). 
Thus this form does not assert the existence of semisets except to the strength of 
axiom F5’. 
It may be noted that all the following theorems can be proved from A10 in r,, 
so that, were we to assume the full strength of this axiom in the intuitionistic 
theory, we could directly obtain the results. 
Lemma 1.8. Any pair (A, 15) of type o is isomorphic to (FN, S). 
The intuitionistic alternative set theory 151 
Proof. The isomorphism is defined as F :A+ FN where F(a) = I(a),J and 
1x1 = least element of {a: E FN: x = a} is the usual definition of cardinality, which 
exists for small sets. Cl 
Also of importance is the lemma: 
Lemma 1.9 (4). Zf X is a countable class then there are sets a, k’ such that C 
linearly orders a and X = (2 E a : (z]= is small}. 
This follows from the axiom of prolongation. 
The concepts of directed and dually directed are defined as in [ll]: 
Definition. X is directed if (Vx, y E X)(3z E X)(x, y E z), and X is dually directed 
if (Vx, y E X)(3z E X)(x, y 3 z). 
Given this we can then prove the main result which allows development in 4 
and hence r,: 
Theorem 1.1. (1) Zf Z is do-set-theoretically defined, X c Z is a semiset, X # 8, 
then : 
(a) Zf Z is closed under G (i.e., x E Z A y E x + y E Z), and directed, then 
(32 E Z)(Vx E X)(x G z). 
(b) Zf Z is dually directed, then (32 E Z)(Vx E X)(z E x). 
(2) Zf Z is A,-set-theoretically defined, and X E Z is a countable semiset, then: 
(a) X directed + (3u E Z)(Vv E X)(u 2 v). 
(b) X dually directed j (3u E Z)(Vv E X)(u c v). 
The proof of (l)(a) uses A,-set-theoretic induction to establish the statement 
(3u, E a)(Vv E a)(lul t v) where a is the set {x E Pu,: (32 E PuO)(z E Z A x E 
z)}, where IJX s uO. (l)(b) uses the same approach on the dual set to a (with the 
set inclusion reversed). (2) relies on Lemma 1.9 to provide a suitable set for a 
A,-set-theoretic induction. 
Full details of the consequences of this result are given in [3]. 
4.4. Inner models of c in AST 
We can define models of 4 in AST which are not themselves models of AST. 
Of particular interest are models in which the set of natural numbers are not 
closed under arithmetic operations such as addition. 
Definition. Let ti be a classical model of AST. Let (Ra)nEN denote the iterated 
power set heirarchy within & as defined in AST by recursion, and let (Y E N be 
infinite in the sense of [ll]: a $ FN. 
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Then we define the structure 93 by: 
B = lJ {R,+,: n E FN}, %=(B,E rB,= IB) 
and with the same interpretation of terms. The set of classes of 93 is 
{X E Class(&): X s B}. 
Lemma 2.1. Zf & is a model of full classical AST, and W is defined from & as 
above, then 93 k Z,. Moreover, in this structure the natural numbers are not closed 
under sum, since (Y + a 4 N, and N is not a scale for V, since LY U (a x (0)) has no 
measure in $33. 
4.5. Choice principles 
In r, it is unreasonable to assume the global form of the axiom of choice for 
classes which Vopenka [ll] adopts in AST: if all nonempty classes are inhaibited, 
then all (predicative) formulae behave classically. Instead intuitionistically 
reasonable principles are used. 
Definition. The Countable Axiom of Choice (CA&) is the principle 
VX (countable(X) j ((V_x E X) 3.z f3(x, z) + 3F [function(F) 
A W E X) ‘3~ Fh))l)). 
This is an axiom of Sochor’s [8]. We can of course prove the axiom of choice for 
sets without this axiom, but CAC is of technical use in the development of AST 
within r,. 
We assume the axiom for all predicative formulae 8. 
4.6. Methods available in G 
In the following we will assume the countable axiom of choice CA& for 
predicative 8. 
Definition. A class X is said to be subcountable if 
3G (function(G) A dom G = FN A ran G =X). 
Note that this may not imply that X is either small or a countable class 
(although the converse holds), since X could have the form of a class X, as 
considered in Section 4.1, with infinitely many elements having a nonzero 
membership value in X, but only a small collection having full membership in X. 
Lemma 3.1. X subcountable j X is inhabited A X is a semiset. 
Lemma 3.2. Zf X is inhabited and decidable, and X c FN, then X is subcountable. 
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Definition. X is strongly reveuled (s.r.) iff 
(VY G X)( Y subcountable * (34 G X)( Y c u)). 
Then every strongly revealed class is revealed, but the converse need not be 
true. However we can obtain analogous results for these classes: 
Lemma 3.3. (i) Vu (set(u fl X)) 3 X s.r. 
(ii) X A&d j X s. r. 
(iii) {X,: n E FN} a sequence of s.r. classes implies that n {X,: n E FN} is s.r. 
(iv) Zf {Xn: n E FN} is a descending sequence of s.r. classes, and each 
n {Xn: 0 s n 6 m} is inhabited, then n {Xn: n E FN} is inhabited. 
(v) If {Xn: n E FN} is a descending sequence of s.e. classes, then 
dom(n{X,:nEFN})=n{domX,:n~FN}. 
(iii) and (iv) follow from Theorem 1.1(2)(a). 
It is possible to adapt the theory of indiscernability equivalences and closures of 
classes to r,. We must change the definitions of I7-class, E-&KS and generating 
sequence to the following: 
Definition. X is a It-class if there exists a sequence {X,: n E FN} of A,-set- 
theoretically defined classes such that X = n {Xn: n E FN}. 
X is a ~-class if there exists a sequence {X,: n E FN} of A,-set-theoretically 
defined classes such that X = lJ {Xn: n E FN}. 
A relation * is a II-equivalence if it is a n-class and an equivalence relation. 
A class sequence (R,: n E FN} is a generating-sequence of e if each R, is 
do-set-theoretically defined, n {R,: n E FN} = k:, and 
(vn E FN)(k Y, z)((x, Y), (Y, 2) E %+I + (.c 2) E RJ. 
We define prolongation of a generating sequence as in [ll], and we can prove 
that every generating sequence of a n-equivalence has a prolongation. We 
define: 
Definition. A R-equivalence k is compact if 
Vu 7maZZ(u) j (3x, y E u)(x f y A x = y)). 
A II-equivalence t is an indiscernability-equivalence if it is a compact 
n-equivalence. 
If we define Fig(X) = {y: (3x E X)(x A y)} for a given IT-equivalence A:, and 
define the conditions for X and Y to be separable: 
sep(X, Y) = 32 (Z &-set-theoretically-defined 
A Fig(X) s Z A Fig(Y) rl 2 = O), 
then many of the results of [ll] can be obtained with these changed meanings. 
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However, if we worked in r, it would not be possible to obtain that 
cfosure(X U Y) E closure(X) U closure(Y) 
where closure(X) = {x: -xep({x}, X)}. 
It is also possible to define a class of rational numbers in AST, and (in Q, to 
derive the following theorem [ll]: 
Theorem3.4. IfO#XxFRN, VXV~(XEXA~EFRNA~~X~~EXX), andN 
k closed under X, then (32 E RN)(X = {x E FRN: x c z}). Zf X # FRN, then 
z E BRN can be obtained. 
5. The interpretation of classical A,, AST in intuitionistic A0 AST 
The Godel negative translation (cf. [lo]) will be used to obtain an inter- 
pretation of 4 in G. For this language this translation is defined by: 
(a) c$’ is C#J if r$ is A,-set-theoretic. 
(b) (5 = q)’ is +z l(z E q = z E E) where z is the first set variable not 
occurring in (E = q), and (53 = r,r) is not a set formula. 
(c) (t E 5)’ is li(t e c), if t e 5 is not a set formula. 
feasible(x) ’ is 1 ifeasible( 
(d) (Q, v 3)’ is l(l$’ A 1111’). ($J A +I)’ is $’ A q’. 
(C#J * r+!~)’ is 9’ + ly’. (i$)’ is i$‘. 
(e) (3x $)’ is iVx i#‘. (Vx #)’ is Vx q5’. 
(3X 9)’ is +X1@‘. (VX @)’ is VX @‘. 
Given this, we can obtain the usual results about the properties of +‘: 
Lemma 4.1. (i) Zf + involves no subformulae of form (b), and no unbounded 
universal quantifiers, then 
r,kC#I’-ll@ 
(ii) For any formula C#I of the language of r, and r,, 
r,k#‘-ll+‘. 
(iii) For each axiom 47 of classical predicate logic, 
&kg?. 
(iv) For each axiom cp of r,, including Prolongation, 
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Proof. (iv) The most difficult case is that of Prolongation. This follows from a 
general property that 
Note that in 4 we can establish the three additional results: 
(0) Every II-equivalence has a generating sequence. 
(1) Every class that is a II-class and a Sclass is A,-std. 
(2) For every indiscernability equivalence *, if R is an upper bound of k, then 
(VZ)(3 )( 4 ) u smu u A u is a maximal R-net on Z). 
Hence their translations (0)‘, (l)‘, (2)’ hold in &. 0 
The interpretation can be extended to the axiom of countable choice, and to 
Vopenka’s axiom of cardinalities. 
Definition. Let RC (Relational Choice) denote the formula 
VR 3F (function(F) A F 5 R A dom F = dom R). 
Then 
r,k(RC+CAC,) 
for predicative 8, and 
r,k(RCjRC’). 
RC does not imply that the logic of the set theory is classical, because there are 
examples of nonclassical Kripke models satisfying F, U {RC}. 
Definition. The Axiom of Cardinalities CRD is the statement 
VXVY(X=SFNvY=SFNvX-Y). 
We have that: 
r, U { CRD} t CRD’. 
6. Classical AST interpreted in intuitionistic AST 
If we strengthen the system G by the following logical axiom: 
(DNS) Vxll8 + l-Vx8 
and by the axiom of Decidable Comprehension: 
All. Vx (e( ) x vle(~)) * vx3yv~(~~y=~~x~e(z)) 
for 8 set-theoretic, which can be seen as stating that the characteristic property of 
a set is that it has a decidable membership criterion, then this yields a system we 
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call IAST, and, if we assume the axiom 
(FSC) v_X3yvz(zEy=zEXAe(z)) 
for all set-theoretic 8 in the corresponding classical theory, we can, via the above 
translation, obtain the following result: 
Theorem 5.1. IAST 18’ for each axiom I3 of classical AST. 
Where we have reformulated classical AST in the two-sorted language of sets 
and classes. 
An interesting consequence of the axiom All is that the predicate small cannot 
be decidable; if it were, then by the axiom, the subclass constructed in Lemma 
1.6 would be a set, but this is immediately contradictory (it would have a last 
element under the given order). 
Theorem 5.2. In IAST, -Vx (small(x) v ismall(x 
7. Conclusion 
We have shown how the Alternative Set Theory can be usefully modified to 
accommodate the possibility that classes and predicates may not obey the laws of 
classical logic. We have argued that this reformulation is closer to the original 
motivations of the AST than the classical formulation, and it allows us to 
represent concepts of feasibility and vagueness in a rigorous framework. Further 
results and related development are contained in [3,4]. 
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